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NOTES AND COMMENT

fication based on the marriage relation is not such an arbitrary and
unreasonable prerogative as would place it in conflict with the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointing out that the
ruling in Schlesinger vs. Wisconsin (supra), is not germane to the
question because there there was no likely relation between the statute
and the alleged evil to be remedied, he upholds the assumption of legislative authority to meet practical exigencies. "Unless it clearly appears
that the enactment has no substantial relation to a proper purpose, it
cannot be said the limit of legislative power has been abused. To hold
otherwise, would be to substitute judicial opinion of expediency for
the will of the Legislature, a notion foreign to the American constitutional system."6 Applying this construction of constitutional limitations
to the instant case, he further cites Income Tax Cases, 134 N.W. 673,
(Wis.), where the court said, "Classification is justifiable in case there
is some substantial difference of situation which suggests the advisability of difference of treatment. We think there is clearly such a difference in this, that experience has demonstrated that otherwise there
will be many opportunities for fraud and evasion of the law which the
close relation of husband and wife or parent and child makes possible
if not easy."
The dissenting view goes on to say that the principal case is not
analogous to the attempt to take one person's property for the purpose
of paying another person's debt which would constitute a denial of the
due process clause, since even though certain Wisconsin statutes declare a separation of property interests, it should not be overlooked
that there is an actual community of interest where husband and wife
live together and each would usually get the benefit of the income of
the other.
SOL GoODSIT

TORTS-PHYSICIANS-MALPRACTICE.
Cook v. Moats, ___ Neb.
___, 238 N.W. 529. The defendant has been a regularly licensed and
practicing osteopathic physician in the City of Blair, Nebraska, for
twelve years. The plaintiff had a pain in her right leg and hip for
some time. She went to the defedant for treatment. On May 6, 1930
in giving her a treatment and bending her knee firmly upward toward
the body, pressing his weight upon it and twisting the same, the femur
was fractured. Some time before this she had had one of her breasts
removed for cancer, and the X-ray photographs taken after the frac6 Purity Extract and Tonic Co. vs. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 33 S. Ct. 44, 57 L. Ed.
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ture show that she had a well-developed carcinoma of the femur or
large bone of the leg which weakened it to at least fifty per cent of
its usual strength at the time it was broken by the manipulations of
the defendant. The defendant knew that this operation had been performed. Any physician of any school, upon learning that an entire
breast had been removed for lumps would suspect the same might
be caused by cancer, and would know that cancer might develop in the
bones of such a patient, and if it did, that such bones would be weakened and could not bear the pressure of twisting that it might be possible to employ in the care of another patient. The plaintiff recovered
and the court said, "Malpractice may consist in a lack of skill or care
in diagnosis as well as in treatment."
According to 48 C. J. 1112, "Malpractice" is bad practice, either
through lack of skill or neglect to apply it, if possessed. The term has
been variously defined as, the negligent performance by a physician or
surgeon of the duties which are devolved and incumbent upon him on
account of his contractual relations with his patient: bad or unskillful
practice by a physician or surgeon, whereby the patient is injured, the
treatment by a surgeon or physician in a manner contrary to accepted
rules and with injurious results to the patient, the bad professional
treatment of disease, pregnancy, or bodily injury, from reprehensible
ignorance or carelessness, or with criminal intent. "Malpractice" is
either wilful, negligent, or ignorant.
In 180 Wis. 238 it is said, "a physician is required to exercise only
that degree of care, diligence, judgment, and skill which other physicians of good standing in the same school or system of practice usually
exercise in the same or similar localities under like or similar circumstances, havng due regard to the advanced state of the medical profession at the time in question." And "Malpractice may consist in a lack
of skill or care in diagnosis as well as in treatment." These rules of
law are supported by: 170 Wis. 579; 183 Wis. 446; and 197 Wis. 405.
In 193 Wis. 588 a doctor used a certain method of treatment which
was recommended to him by a famous English physician. The practice
was an accepted practice in the profession although the physician did
not know it, and the court held that, "His ignorance is immaterial if
his practice is right." This is also supported by 158 Wis. 184 and 147
N.W. 1033.
The writer's conclusion is that "Malpractice" in Wisconsin is the
failure of a physician or surgeon to diagnose or treat according to that
degree of care, diligence, and skill which other physicians of good
standing in the same school or system of practice usually exercise in
the same or similar localities under like or similar circumstances, hav-
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ing due regard to the advanced state of the medical profession at the
time in question.
JOSEPH

J. DoucETrE

MASTER AND SERVANT-JOINT -EMPLOYERS-WORKMEN'S COVPFNSATION.

Murphy Supply Co., Appellant, vs. Frederickson et al, Re-

spondent) --. Wis..., 239 N.W. 420. This is an appeal from a decision

affirming a judgment given by the Industrial Commission in favor of
Frederickson. The point in question was whether or not one joint employer was solely liable in damages .to employee injured on that employer's premises.
The Murphy Supply Co., appellant, and the Morley Co. have their
respective business establishments within a half-block of each other;
and neither believing that it individually could afford a night watchman agreed some twenty years ago to jointly employ a man in that
capacity. The Morley Co. which occupied a larger amount of floor
space than the Murphy Co. was to hire the many and pay him $105
per month; of that sum the appellant agreed to contribute $40. Fredrickson, who had been a night.watchman for five or six years, commenced working for the Morley and Murphy Cos. on April 3, 1930.
While he was making his rounds in the Murphy Co. he fell into an
opening in the floor sustaining the injuries that resulted in his disability.
The Appellant admitted the Respondent's right to recover damages,
but contended (1) that the respondent was the employee of the Morley Co. and not of appellant company; (2) that even if appellant is
liable at all the Morley Co. must be jointly liable because the respondent was employed jointly by both companies.
The Supreme Court disposed of the first question in short order
holding that the Morley Co. was not singly the employer because the
nature of the Morley Co.'s business was not that of furnishing night
watchmen, nor did they make a profit on Frederickson's services in the
instant case. But as they both agreed to employ the night watchman in
common, they were joint employers of the respondent.
The important point of the case, however, is the decision in regard
to the appellant's second contention, the matter of joint liability of
joint employers in damages to employee. In rendering its decision the
court recalled the case of Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, as saying
that the intention and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act
was to place the burden on the particular industry in which the injury
occurred. That rule was inferred in the late case of Conveyor's Corp.
vs. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 200 Wis. 512, where the Con-

